Abstract-The paper proposes a new state machine replication protocol for the partially synchronous system model with Byzantine faults. The algorithm, called BFT-Mencius, guarantees that the latency of updates initiated by correct processes is eventually upper-bounded, even in the presence of Byzantine processes. BFTMencius is based on a new communication primitive, Abortable Timely Announced Broadcast (ATAB), and does not use signatures. We evaluate the performance of BFT-Mencius in cluster settings, and show that it provides bounded latency and good throughput, being comparable to the state-of-the-art algorithms such as PBFT and Spinning in fault-free configurations and outperforming them under performance attacks by Byzantine processes.
I. INTRODUCTION
We become increasingly dependent on online services; therefore, their availability and correct behavior become increasingly important. In order to guarantee that services are available in spite of failures one basic strategy is to use replication: By replicating a service on multiple servers, clients are guaranteed that even if some replica fails, the service is still available. State machine replication (SMR) is a general approach for replicating services that can be modeled as a deterministic state machine [1] . The key idea of this approach is to guarantee that all replicas start in the same state and then apply requests from clients in the same order, thereby guaranteeing that the replicas' states will not diverge.
Most current deployments of SMR in industry handle benign failures only, with all major players employing some sort of replication in their infrastructure (e.g., Zookeeper [2] , Chubby [3] , Dynamo [4] ). However, SMR protocols that tolerate arbitrary failures (Byzantine faults) have started to be considered as a viable option for ensuring continuous operation of critical infrastructure control systems for electricity distribution, water treatment and traffic control [5] .
Byzantine fault-tolerant replication algorithms allow computer systems to continue to provide a correct service even when some of their components behave in an arbitrary way, either due to faults or due to a malicious intruder. Although Byzantine failures have already been introduced in 1980 [6] , Byzantine fault tolerant (BFT) replication protocols were considered too expensive to be practical [7] . This changed when Castro and Liskov introduced "Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance" (PBFT) [8] . They showed that in the fault-free settings BFT replication protocols can achieve performance that is close to that of non-replicated systems. The key observation that made PBFT practical was using MACs instead of signatures, which were the main performance bottleneck in previous systems [8] . Indeed, while our implementation of PBFT (cf. Section VII for details) achieves peak throughput of 52K requests per second with average client-latency of 4.5 ms, once we introduced RSA signatures to PBFT, peak throughput dropped to 6K requests per second with 20ms latency.
After PBFT, several similar approaches continuously improved performance in the fault-free case (e.g., Zyzzyva [9] ). However, like PBFT, most of these protocols are fixed sequencer protocols [10] , i.e., a single server has a special role to propose order of requests. Amir et al. showed [11] that this class of protocols is vulnerable to performance attacks. The key observation is that a malicious sequencer can delay the ordering of requests, causing a considerable increase in latency and a great reduction in throughput. Performance failures were defined as faulty servers behaving as "correct but very slow" servers. More precisely, servers exhibiting performance failures follow the protocol, but sending messages is delayed; typically just in time to avoid triggering protocol timeouts that will get them demoted. This makes it very hard to detect such faults and to apply some kind of reconfiguration, in order to reduce the impact on the protocol. Bounding the service response time (or other performance guarantees) is not only of theoretical interests. For instance, in Amazon's Dynamo [4] , there is a formal service level agreement where a client and a service agree on the client's expected request rate distribution and the expected service latency under those conditions. Amir et al. [11] also proposed a new performance-oriented criterion, called bounded-delay, that requires that, given a system that is not overloaded and where servers have sufficient bandwidth to communicate, in a (long enough) period of synchrony the latency of updates initiated by correct servers is eventually upper-bounded, even in the presence of Byzantine servers. Thus ensuring bounded-delay could be considered as capturing what one would informally describe as tolerating performance failures.
Unfortunately, this is not entirely true, because the definition of bounded-delay does not tell us how big the upper-bound should be. Consider for example protocols that continuously rotate the leader, such as Aardvark [12] or Spinning [13] (which do not consider bounded-delay as a criterion). It can be easily seen that such protocols are able to guarantee an upperbound of f · T , where f is the number of faulty servers and T is a protocol timeout whose expiration triggers reconfiguration mechanism such as view change. The intuition behind such claim is simple: in the worst case, from the time a correct server p has a request to propose (e.g., because it received it from a client), until it can propose the request, the server needs to wait until n − 1 instances of other servers have terminated. Even if p forwards the request to other servers when it is not its turn, the next f instances may be coordinated by faulty servers. As the timeout values are normally chosen rather conservatively 1 , the guaranteed bound can be significantly higher than the latency in the failure-free case. Thus, providing such bound does not really match the intuition one has for tolerating performance attacks. One would rather expect that algorithms that tolerate performance attacks achieve the same order of performance as in the failure-free case, where latency is in the order of the real communication delay among servers.
Apart from defining new performance criteria, Amir et al. also proposed [11] 2 Therefore, it is very hard (if not impossible) for a correct server to determine a bound that defines an acceptable level of performance in such centralized protocols. In a sense, adding a pre-agreement phase makes Prime a less centralized protocol, as in the preagreement phase all servers have the same role. So although still based on the fixed-sequencer scheme, being more decentralized allows Prime to reduce the impact a faulty sequencer can have on the protocol, by demoting the sequencer if it does not provide the acceptable level of performance that is in the order of real communication delay among correct servers. When comparing Prime with PBFT we see that ensuring the stronger performance criteria comes at a price: reintroducing signatures makes it costly for cluster settings, and adding the pre-agreement phase strongly affects performance in the failure-free case.
In this paper, we propose a new BFT SMR protocol, BFTMencius, that ensures bounded-delay that is in the order of real communication delay among correct servers, but does not incur additional costs (as Prime). The key to do so is to go one step further: Instead of adding a decentralized pre-agreement phase to PBFT as in Prime, BFT-Mencius is a fully decentralized protocol where all servers propose in different instances of a sub-protocol called ATAB (explained below) concurrently.
In more detail, BFT-Mencius is inspired by Mencius [14] , an efficient multi-leader SMR protocol that tolerates (only) crash faults, originally designed for WAN settings. Mencius uses an (infinite) sequence of instances of a subprotocol referred to as simple consensus, where only a pre-determined initial leader can propose any value; the others can only propose a special no-op value. A basic idea of Mencius is to partition the sequence of instances among the servers such that each server is the coordinator in an infinite number of instances. For instance, servers can take the role of coordinating instances in round-robin fashion. As servers take turns proposing values, Mencius itself is a moving sequencer atomic broadcast protocol. As such, the difficult part of Mencius is (i) preventing servers that do not have requests to propose from blocking the protocol and (ii) dealing with instances where the coordinator is a faulty server. While the latter is handled inside simple consensus, the former is handled by servers allowing to skip their turns by proposing a special no-op request. The key to Mencius' performance is that simple consensus allows servers to skip their turns without having to execute the full agreement protocol, thereby requiring to wait for messages from a majority of servers. In fact, Mencius even allows servers to skip implicitly by participating in higher numbered instances started by "faster" servers.
As Mao et al. [14] pointed out, such a mechanism does not work in the Byzantine tolerant systems, because not all decisions are communicated through a quorum. Therefore, we designed BFT-Mencius using an abstraction that we call Abortable Timely Announced Broadcast (ATAB). ATAB is a new broadcast primitive, that is similar to Timely Announced Broadcast [15] and Terminating Reliable Broadcast (TRB). In contrast to these two, it is specified such that it can be implemented in the partially synchronous system model. Like these two primitives (owing to the fact that it is a broadcast abstraction) each instance of ATAB has a dedicated sender. BFT-Mencius lets servers skip their turns by proposing noop requests, and relies on ATAB to terminate instances with faulty dedicated sender within bounded time. Furthermore, its announcement property allows to tie the start times of different instances together thereby enabling correct servers to compute during the synchronous period a threshold for "acceptable speed" with which servers should start and terminate its ATAB instances. This knowledge is used in the blacklisting mechanism that ensures that faulty servers behave according to this bound; otherwise they get blacklisted and their subsequent ATAB instances ignored.
As we mentioned before, although BFT-Mencius provides strong performance guarantees, this does not penalize performance in the failure-free case, where its latency and throughput are comparable to state-of-the-art algorithms such as PBFT and Spinning [13] . We implemented the prototype of BFTMencius and evaluated its performance in cluster settings. We show that it provides bounded delay and good throughput, both in fault-free configurations and under performance attacks by Byzantine servers. For example, BFT-Mencius achieves a throughput of 45K requests per second with latency always below 5ms even under performance attacks.
Contribution:
We propose a new BFT state machine replication protocol, BFT-Mencius, that guarantees a boundeddelay in the order of PBFT's latency in the failure-free case.
Thus it tolerates performance attacks. Key to achieving this is by concurrently running multiple interlocked instances of new broadcast-abstraction called ATAB, which does not use signatures. This makes BFT-Mencius a modular protocol, which, we think, makes it simpler to understand, implement and test than other BFT SMR protocols, which are in general monolithic and often rather complex.
The remainder of the paper is as follows: We discuss related work in Section II. Section III defines a system model considered and gives the problem definitions. ATAB is introduced in Section IV, and the total order broadcast algorithm based on ATAB in Section V. The complete BFT-Mencius algorithm is given in Section VI. We evaluate performance of BFT-Mencius in Section VII and conclude in Section VIII.
II. RELATED WORK
As already noted in Section I, BFT-Mencius is inspired by Mencius [14] . In a recent position paper [16] , the same authors discuss the design of RAM, which is a variant of Mencius that tolerates Byzantine faults by relying on trusted components. However, it does not consider performance failures and does not ensure bounded-delay. Since tolerating performance failures is central to achieving bounded delay, in the following we focus on work that considers performance attacks.
Amir et al. [11] showed that malicious processes can significantly reduce throughput and increase the service latency in previous BFT protocols, by sending valid messages but as slow as possible without triggering timeouts. Moreover, they also introduced a protocol called Prime that ensures bounded delay. We have already discussed Prime in Section I in detail.
Although Prime is the only protocol (before BFT-Mencius) that considers bounded-delay as performance criteria, it is not the only work that considers performance attacks. In a similar spirit, Clement et al. [12] have advocated what they called robust BFT: they propose to shift the focus from algorithms that optimize only best case performance, and to design algorithms that can offer predictable performance under the broadest possible set of circumstances-including when faults occur. To this end they propose a set of mechanisms to increase robustness of PBFT, in a system called Aardvark. Aardvark decreases the impact of a slow leader by constantly monitoring the throughput sustained in the current view and by regularly performing view-changes. The idea of always rotating the sequencer was also used in BAR-B [17] , but with different purpose. BAR-B is a cooperative backup system designed for the Byzantine-Altruistic-Rational model, where the leader is always changed so that every node has the equal opportunity to submit proposals to the system. Continuously changing the leader is also used in Spinning [13] , with the goal to reduce the effect of performance attacks by Byzantine processes. In Spinning, the leader is changed after it defined the order of a single batch of requests, making leader change more efficient under performance failures than with Aardvark since there is no need for a complex view change protocol 3 . Spinning is also more efficient than BAR-B because it does not use signatures and ordering a request takes three communication steps compared to six with BAR-B. In order to prevent a faulty process from periodically impairing the protocol performance by requiring merge phases, Spinning introduces a blacklisting mechanism. Processes that are in the blacklist loose the privilege to propose, i.e., instances where they are primary are skipped. After a successful merge phase in view v, the primary of the view v − 1 is added to the blacklist. As the merge phase is triggered once the timeout expires in view v − 1, this blacklisting mechanism is still vulnerable to performance failures. BFT-Mencius also contains a blacklisting mechanism, but it uses a different detection mechanism which makes it very effective in detecting performance failures.
The common property of all three protocols, Aardvark, BAR-B and Spinning, is that all servers are allowed to propose requests only once it is their turn. As already explained in Section I, these algorithms ensure bounded-delay, but with an upper-bound in the order of f · T . As we show in Section VI, BFT-Mencius does not have such limitation: its latency does not depend on number of faulty processes, and is in the order of the actual communication delay among correct processes.
As mentioned above, the power of performance attacks stems from exploiting the fact that there is a process with a special role (leader, coordinator, sequencer). So in order to lessen the impact of performance attacks, one approach is to make the protocol decentralized (i.e., leader-free). We know only of one deterministic BFT protocols for partially synchronous systems that has this property [18] . However, the algorithm terminates only in the order of f · T even in the failure-free case. The same applies to protocols for synchronous systems like [6] .
Contrary to deterministic BFT protocols, most randomized BFT protocols (e.g., [19] , [20] , [21] ) are decentralized (there are no processes with special role) and work in the asynchronous systems; therefore faulty processes can not prevent correct processes from moving forward by delaying messages. Although, the intuition suggests that this makes randomized protocols less vulnerable to performance failures, we are not aware of a study that validates such claim. As these protocols are normally considered more costly in the failure-free case than deterministic protocols, we believe that making a detailed comparison study of these two groups of protocols is an interesting research topic.
III. DEFINITIONS

A. Model
We consider a system composed of n server processes Π = {1, . . . , n} and a finite number of clients processes connected by point-to-point channels. Servers and clients can be correct or faulty, where correct servers and clients follow the algorithm and the faulty one may behave in an arbitrary way, i.e., we consider Byzantine faults. We assume than any number of clients can be faulty, but the number of faulty servers is limited to f .
We assume integrity of channels, that is if a process p received a message m from process q, then q sent message m to p before. We consider a partially synchronous system model: in all executions of the system, there is a bound Δ and an instant GST (Global Stabilization Time) such that all communication among correct processes after GST is reliable and Δ-timely, i.e., if a correct process p sends message m at time t ≥ GST to correct process q, then q will receive m before t+Δ. We do not make any assumption before GST . For example, messages among correct processes can be delayed, dropped or duplicated before GST . Spoofing/impersonation attacks are assumed to be impossible also before GST .
We assume that process steps (which might include sending and receiving messages) take zero time. Processes are equipped with clocks able to measure local timeouts.
B. Replicated State Machines
Following Schneider [1] , we note that the following is key for implementing a replicated state machine tolerant to f (Byzantine) faults:
Replica Coordination. All [non-faulty] replicas receive and process the same sequence of requests.
Moreover, as Schneider also notes this property can be decomposed into two parts, Agreement and Order: Agreement requires all (non-faulty) replicas to receive all requests, and Order requires that the order of received requests is the same at all replicas. In SMR protocols, Agreement and Order are often ensured by servers proposing client requests using a communication primitive known as atomic broadcast or totalorder broadcast [22] . We also follow this approach.
C. Total-Order Broadcast
Total Order Broadcast is defined in terms of two primitives, to-broadcast and to-deliver. A process p that wishes to broadcast a message m from the set of messages M invokes to-broadcast(m). A message m is delivered by process q by executing to-deliver(m). We assume that the sender of a message can be determined from the message (denoted by sender(m)) and that all messages are unique. Both can be easily achieved by adding process identifiers and sequencenumbers to messages. Total order broadcast fulfills the following properties [23] :
• TO-Validity: If p invokes to-broadcast(m) and p is correct then p eventually executes to-deliver(m).
• TO-Agreement: If a correct process p executes to-deliver(m), then every correct process q eventually executes to-deliver(m).
• TO-Integrity: For any message m, any correct process p executes to-deliver(m) at most once. If sender(m) is correct, then it previously invoked to-broadcast(m).
• TO-Order: If correct processes p and q execute to-deliver(m) and to-deliver(m ), then p delivers m before m if and only if q delivers m before m .
IV. ABORTABLE TIMELY ANNOUNCED BROADCAST
In this section we introduce a new broadcasting primitive called abortable timely announced broadcast (ATAB), that we will use later to solve Total-Order broadcast. ATAB is defined in terms of four primitives: atab-cast (m), atab-abort, atab-announce, atab-deliver (m). The first two primitives are invoked by processes, while the latter two are triggered by ATAB. Moreover, there is a dedicated sending process s and no correct process p = s executes atab-cast . If s is correct and it has a message m to broadcast it executes atab-cast (m). Note that while we define ATAB as a one-shot problem with a fixed sender, we will use multiple instances of ATAB, with different sending processes for different ATAB instances. When a process delivers a message m it executes atab-deliver (m). Like with timely announced broadcast (TAB) [15] a process is notified of an ongoing broadcast by atab-announce before a message is actually delivered. In contrast to TAB we require all correct processes to eventually execute atab-deliver , much like terminating reliable broadcast (TRB). Like TRB we also allow delivery of a special value ⊥. Unlike TRB which is designed for synchronous systems 4 and benign faults, ATAB is designed to tolerate Byzantine faults in partially synchronous systems. Therefore, we allow ⊥ to be delivered only if some correct process aborts the broadcast by invoking atab-abort. Typically, this occurs when the protocol using ATAB suspects the sending process s. It is known that in the presence of Byzantine faults failure detection requires application knowledge [24] . The idea of atab-abort is to make this knowledge explicit, and the idea of atab-announce is to help with failure detection. A. Solving ATAB Algorithms that solve ATAB are similar to algorithms that solve consensus. In fact, we can solve ATAB by using a coordinator based consensus algorithm that tolerates Byzantine faults [25] and adding the atab-announce up-call and the atab-abort down-call. The sender process execute atab-cast (m) where it would execute propose(m) in the consensus protocol, while atab-deliver (m) is triggered at the point the consensus protocol invokes decide(m). As such consensus protocols normally proceed in a sequence of views (sometimes also called ballots or phases), the protocol would normally react to an atab-abort call by changing the view. The algorithm requires n > 3f processes to tolerate at most f Byzantine faults. It is inspired by the PBFT SMR algorithm by Castro and Liskov [8] , therefore we call it CL-ATAB. Contrary to PBFT which solves SMR (multiple instances problem), CL-ATAB solves the single instance problem ATAB. The algorithm proceeds in views where each view is an attempt to decide what message should be atab-delivered. Furthermore, in every view there is a single process that is the coordinator (of the view). The assignment scheme of views to coordinators is known to all processes. The sender s is the coordinator of the initial view. The initial view is very similar to the "normal case" protocol of PBFT with addition of atab-announce upcalls as shown in Figure 1 . A process executes atab-announce once it receives the PRE-PREPARE message from the sender, or once it receives COMMIT messages from f + 1 processes. The latter is related to ATAB-Announcement. It ensures that once a correct process executes atab-deliver , all correct processes eventually execute atab-announce. The reason is the following: Once a correct process executes atab-deliver , it received COMMIT message from a quorum of processes (in case n = 3f + 1, the size of quorum is 2f + 1). Since we assume that n > 3f , at least f + 1 correct processes sent COMMIT to all. In CL-ATAB, we assume that messages sent by correct processes are periodically retransmitted, so all correct processes eventually receive f + 1 COMMIT messages and execute atab-announce.
All subsequent views of CL-ATAB are very similar to the "view change protocol" of PBFT. A process p advances from view v to view v + 1 for a number of reasons:
• p leaves the initial view v = 1 upon atab-abort.
• p enters view v + 1 when the timeout expires and p
has not yet delivered a message. This timeout is started when atab-announce is executed, or when p receives VIEWCHANGE for view v from 2f + 1 processes.
• Finally, p moves to view v + 1 upon receiving VIEWCHANGE for view v + 1 from a correct process.
Due to space constraints the full algorithm is deferred to the technical report [26] , where we show along the following theorem and provide a more detailed timing analysis. 
V. SOLVING TOTAL-ORDER BROADCAST WITH ATAB
In this section, we present the central part of our BFT SMR protocol, which is a protocol that solves total-order broadcast, see Algorithm 1. It is inspired by Mencius [14] , an efficient multi-leader SMR. The algorithm relies on the ATAB primitive for sending messages and refers to the values d 1 and d 2 .
A. Basic idea
Algorithm 1 runs an infinite sequence of ATAB instances. We add a number i to ATAB calls to refer to ATAB instance i. These instances are evenly partitioned among the servers. Function owner(i), known to all processes, returns the sender for instance i.
For every process p, index p is the next ATAB instance in which p is the sender. In order to to-broadcast a message m a process p executes atab-cast (index p , m) in the ATAB instance index p (line 9) and then updates index p (line 10).
Once a process p learns that ATAB instance i terminated (execution of atab-deliver (i, m), line 11), it executes the following steps:
• If p is the sender in instance i, i.e., owner(i) = p, p has sent m but delivered m = m (necessarily m = ⊥), then p to-broadcasts m again (line 17).
• Process p executes the CheckCommit procedure (lines 24-30), which uses the expected p variable to keep track of the lowest yet undecided ATAB instance. Inside CheckCommit, p increases expected p as far as possible, executing to-deliver for all messages that are not noop.
Note that according to the CheckCommit procedure, p executes to-deliver(m) in the order of ATAB instances. Therefore the message delivered in instance i cannot be todelivered before all instances j < i have terminated. Since processes might to-broadcast at different rates, we need a mechanism to allow processes to fill the gaps so that the message delivered by ATAB instance i is not delayed because another process has nothing to broadcast in instance j < i. This is discussed in the two next paragraphs.
B. Process p skipping its own instances
In order to fill these gaps, a correct process will skip its instance j by broadcasting a special message noop. A process could execute atab-cast (j, noop) when it sees that there is a decision in some instance i > j. However, skipping instance only once a higher number instance i terminates is unnecessarily late: as processes know that instance i is in progress already before decision. More precisely, in case a correct process p sees that some other process, say q, broadcasted in instance i > index p (by executing atab-announce in instance i, line 20), then p skips all instances j with index p ≤ j < i where p is the sender (lines 21-23) . Here, the other correct processes handle instance j like any other instance owned by p. This is not the case in the next paragraph.
C. Process p skipping instances of other processes
The skipping mechanism of the previous paragraph is able to fill only those gaps caused by correct processes not broadcasting. Contrary to correct processes, a (Byzantine) faulty process cannot be required to skip its instances. Therefore, a different mechanism is needed for the instances owned by a faulty process. Put differently, correct processes need a means to ensure that instances owned by faulty processes will terminate. ATAB provides the atab-abort primitive to this end. However, executing atab-abort too early might lead to deliver ⊥ in ATAB instances owned by correct processes. This can be avoided during a synchronous period, i.e., after GST, with a timeout of d 2 +d 1 , see lines 6 and 19. Consider some process p that terminates instance i at time T . By ATAB-Announcement, all correct processes execute atab-announce for instance i at latest at T + d 2 . By line 22, these processes atab-cast in all instances j < i for which they are sender (and which they did not atab-cast before). By ATAB-Validity, these instances will all terminate within d 1 , that is before
Since process p does not execute atab-abort p (j) for the yet undecided instances j before T , instances owned by correct processes are indeed not aborted too early (see lines 19 and 31-33).
D. Correctness proof
Lemma 1. Assume a correct process s calls atab-cast (i, m) (in line 9) at time σ. If σ > GST + d 2 then no correct process aborts before deciding.
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Lemma 2. If a correct process s calls to-broadcast(m), then all correct processes eventually to-deliver m from s.
Proof: When s calls to-broadcast(m), it executes atab-cast (i, m) for some i. If it does so after GST + d 2 , then from Lemma 1 it follows that instance i will not be aborted, and therefore ATAB-Validity, ensures that all processes will execute atab-deliver (i, m) and thus set decided[i] ← m. Eventually, all instances j < i will terminate as well, so processes will execute CheckCommit with decided[j] = ⊥ for all j ≤ i, and will thus to-deliver m. to-deliver(m) 30:
expectedp ← expectedp + 1
31: Function OnT imeout(i) :
32:
atab-cast (k, m) and atab-deliver (k, m). (ATAB-Agreement implies that all others will also execute atab-deliver (k, m).)
We show this by contradiction and assume that there is no k such that s executes atab-deliver (k, m). Then line 17 entails that there is an infinite sequence of instances that all decide ⊥ although m was proposed. Clearly, one of them must start at some time σ > GST + d 2 , which by Lemma 1 implies that s will atab-deliver within d 1 . A contradiction.
Proposition 1. Given an implementation of ATAB, Algorithm 1 solves Total-Order Broadcast.
Proof: TO-Validity follows from Lemma 2.
From the ATAB-Agreement and ATAB-Integrity properties it follows that if p executes line 13 for some i and v ∈ M then so will any correct q, and both will do so exactly once. Since these non-⊥ values of decided p determine for which messages m and processes s that p executes to-deliver p (m) for, TO-Agreementfollows.
We now turn to the first part of TO-Integrity: The whileloop of CheckCommit ensures that p executes to-deliver(m) for every value of expected p at most once. The condition of line 28 then entails that m was not to-delivered for a previous value of expected p 
VI. BFT-MENCIUS
In this section we describe the complete BFT-Mencius protocol for SMR that is based on the Total Order Broadcast Algorithm 1. In BFT-Mencius clients send requests to servers (details below), which use total-order broadcast to order requests. After a request is executed by some server, the server sends the reply to the corresponding client. A client accepts a response only once it received f + 1 identical responses from f + 1 servers.
In Byzantine-fault tolerant state machine replication only requests proposed by clients should be executed. This requirement is trivially ensured by using cryptographic signatures to sign client requests. Request authentication can also be achieved using MACs [8] , [27] . Although BFT-Mencius would in principle also work with other ways of request authentication, we assume in this paper that request authentication is done using MACs as in [8] and in other protocols that will be compared experimentally with BFT-Mencius.
In BFT-Mencius every server is able to propose requests, thus different variants of load balancing of client requests can be used. However, finding the optimal load balancing scheme is outside the scope of this paper. For simplicity, we assume here a static assignment of clients to servers based on their id. Servers propose requests they receive from clients assigned by this scheme. In the presence of faulty servers some clients will be assigned to faulty servers. In order to ensure that requests from such clients will be ordered and executed, an additional mechanism is necessary: clients send each request to all servers, 6 and servers keep track of requests not assigned to them. They propose any requests that are not executed within some time. For instance, if a server finds a request req that is not executed after the server has terminated k of its own ATAB instances, the server proposes req. 7 In our experiments we have set k = 3. Thus faulty servers cannot starve clients by ignoring their requests.
Moreover, since we use a (numbered) sequence of instances we have to prevent a faulty server from exhausting the space of sequence numbers by starting ATAB instances with a very 6 Since messages might be lost before GST , we actually assume clients periodically retransmit. 7 In fact it is sufficient if requests assigned to a certain server are tracked only by f other servers (instead of all). large instance numbers. To this end, every server can have at most one outstanding non-decided instance. Put differently, a server will not react on messages received for some instance j owned by a process q if it has not terminated in all instances k < j owned by q. Note that this also allows for ATAB instance numbers to have finite size and therefore wrap, because the set of instance numbers concurrently in use is bounded.
Algorithm 2 Blacklisting mechanism
BFT-Mencius uses batching of client requests, which is well known to be essential for good performance. In the rest of this section we explain additional mechanisms that are employed in BFT-Mencius in order to minimize the negative impact a faulty process can have on the performance of the protocol.
A. Dealing with slow servers
The mechanism just presented addresses the problem of requests sent by clients assigned to faulty servers. Here we address the problem of faulty servers slowing down the ordering of requests assigned to other servers. In the total order broadcast algorithm (Algorithm 1) a faulty server can do a performance attack by delaying its own instances. This is because the message of ATAB instance i is not delivered until all instances j < i have terminated. We address this issue by introducing a blacklisting mechanism used as follows (we discuss when to suspect servers in Section VI-B): ATAB instance i waits for the termination of only those instances j < i that are not owned by servers on the blacklist. That is, instances whose owners are in the blacklist are skipped, i.e., the effect is equivalent to the case where noop was decided. Therefore, it is important that the blacklist is kept consistent among all servers. Because the blacklist may be seen as a state machine, we can use our SMR protocol to ensure consistency (similar to how reconfiguration in benign systems can be done [28] ).
The blacklist is implemented as a circular buffer of size f , thus adding the (f + 1)-st server will rehabilitate the server that is longest in the list. A server p adds a server q to its (version of the) blacklist once f + 1 servers suspected q. In order for the blacklists to remain consistent, we thus have to apply suspicion reports from processes consistently. To this end process p will use Total-Order Broadcast to distribute SUSPECT, q messages signifying the fact that p suspects q. This value will then be broadcasted using p's next ATAB instance as a normal request, and thus stored in all correct servers decided list at the same position. In order to avoid that p uses its ATAB instances for SUSPECT messages, SUSPECT messages are piggy-backed on the normal messages or noop messages that are to-broadcast.
We show how the blacklisting mechanism conceptually works in Algorithm 2. It includes: (i) the suspect(q) function, used by server p to locally trigger blacklisting mechanism once it suspects some server q, (ii) a modified version of the Since ATAB instances of server p are ignored while p is on the blacklist, messages to-broadcast by p cannot be delivered. Thus once p is added to the blacklist, p's clients are reassigned to servers not in the blacklist. At this point all requests from reassigned clients not executed will be proposed by the newly assigned server. 8 
B. Ensuring Bounded Delay
The blacklisting mechanism is very general, i.e., it can be used to report any suspicious behaviour. As in this paper we are interested in ensuring bounded delay, we use it to report when a server is slow. To do so we rely on the properties of ATAB that hold during a synchronous period, i.e., after GST. More precisely, once a correct server executes atab-cast (i, m) at time t in line 9 of Algorithm 1, by the ATAB-Announcement property we know that all correct servers execute atab-announce(i) the latest at time t + d 2 . Therefore, all correct servers start their instances j, with j < i, the latest at time t+d 2 . By ATAB-Validity all such instances terminate the latest at time t + d 2 + d 1 . Therefore, if at time t > t+ d 2 + d 1 , some instance j < i has not terminated, the owner of instance j is suspected and suspect(owner(j)) is executed. The owner of an instance is also suspected if a server executes atab-abort (line 33 of Algorithm 1). This solution is able to guarantee bounded delay that does not depend on the number of faulty servers.
C. Improving the Delay Bound
However, d 1 and d 2 are worst case bounds. For blacklisting, 9 we would like to replace the d 1 +d 2 timeout by a smaller value, that is in the order of the real communication delay. To do so, similarly as in Prime [11] , we assume that network eventually meets certain stability conditions. More precisely, we assume that after GST the duration of ATAB instances running concurrently do not differ substantially between owning servers. Let d AT AB be the duration of ATAB instances measured by server p. This leads us to estimate the "actual value" of d 1 in the run as d AT AB , and since d 2 < d 1 , we (conservatively) also estimate d 2 as d AT AB . This leads us to use 2 · K lat · d AT AB as a timeout to suspect servers, where K lat is a system parameter that accounts for variability in latencies on the network. As we will show in Section VII, in the cluster settings, K lat = 1 is sufficient to reliably detect a faulty server doing a performance attack. In less homogeneous settings, it could be preferable to use a more complex way to determine this timeout, for example by taking the median of recent durations of ATAB instances owned by different servers, by adding additional weight factors, or just by using a bigger value for K lat .
In addition to suspecting servers based on their latency, it is possible to use additional strategies for detecting faulty servers. For example, one could measure the number of requests executed in the last n instances owned by each server, and suspect servers whose number is less than 50 percent of the average number of requests executed by servers. Aardvark [12] uses a similar idea to suspect the current leader. While this and other techniques of suspecting the current leader based on performance or fairness criteria easily carry over from Aardvark and other protocols, we did not consider them for BFT-Mencius, because our main goal is the ability to ensure bounded delay. In any case, if the suspect mechanism used leads to frequent changes of the blacklist, this can only lead to requests being proposed by multiple servers thereby causing performance degradation. In the next section we explain how the blacklisting mechanism, even with a suspect timeout of 0 (meaning that correct processes are continuously being suspected by other correct processes), cannot prevent the progress of our SMR algorithm.
D. Blacklisting cannot impair liveness
Assume by contradiction that there is a request req which is never executed and that n = 3f + 1. Then after the repropose timeout (see beginning of the Section VI) expired at all correct processes, any correct process will propose req in it's next ATAB instances. Let us assume that the timeout expires at time t. As the request req is never executed, all instances started after time t are either skipped or owned by a faulty process. As there are at most f processes in the blacklist, but 2f + 1 correct processes, which have to be in the blacklist whenever their instances would be decided, the blacklist needs to be continuously updated after time t. Otherwise, req would be delivered by the first instance started after t and owned by a correct process.
As we have seen, we require that each correct process q is repeatedly added to the blacklist. Since suspected [q] is reset when q is added to the blacklist, in order for q to be added again later, it is necessary that f + 1 processes suspect q, i.e., f + 1 ATAB instances owned by different processes need to deliver SUSPECT, q without being skipped (see Algorithm 2) . As there are at most f faulty processes, this means a correct process p has to suspect q in a successful instance i started after t. But then p also proposed req in that instance, and req will be executed. A contradiction.
VII. EVALUATION
We have implemented a prototype of BFT-Mencius in Scala using the Distal framework [29] . Distal is a framework that allows writing code in a domain specific language (DSL) that is close to the protocol description. Therefore, it leads to the implementations that reflects the protocol specification on paper. Finally, it leads to the efficient protocol implementation. As Distal currently does not provide authenticated channels, we extended Distal's messaging layer to support message authentication based on SHA-1 HMACs. In order to compare BFT-Mencius with the state-of-the-art protocols based on the same code base, we have implemented the normal case of PBFT and Spinning using Distal. We do not experimentally compare BFT-Mencius with Prime because (as mentioned in Section I) adding signatures to PBFT has already lead to a significant drop in performance even without adding the preagreement phase.
We make the following two points with the experimental evaluation of BFT-Mencius. First, it shows that the modular BFT-Mencius protocol has performance comparable to PBFT and Spinning in the failure-free case. Second, it shows that BFT-Mencius is able to sustain good performance (similar to the failure-free case) even under performance attack.
A. Experimental setup and methodology
The experiments were run in the Suno cluster of the Grid5000 testbed. This cluster consists of nodes with dual 2.26GHz Intel Xeon E5520 processors, 32GB of memory, and 1Gb/s Ethernet connections. Nodes were running Linux, kernel version 2.6.32-5, and Oracles Java 64-Bit Server VM version 1.6.0 26.
The workload was generated by nodes located in the same cluster as the servers. Clients send requests (20B of payload) in a closed loop, waiting for the answer to the current request before sending the next one. We consider a setup with n = 4 servers that can tolerate one faulty server (f = 1). Each experiment was run for 3 minutes, with the first minute ignored in the calculation of the results. The service is a simple (stateless) echoing service that sends back the request as its response.
We use as metrics (i) the throughput in requests per second and (ii) the client response time. The client response time is the time from the point the client sends a request until it receives the corresponding reply from f + 1 servers. Note that client response time includes delays incurred by queuing of requests at servers. As mentioned in Section I, guarantees for client latency assume a maximum client load. 
B. Failure-free executions
First we are interested in the maximum throughput and the corresponding response time in failure free executions. In order to compare the algorithms under different load, we vary the number of clients from 30 to 500, which were evenly distributed over 15 nodes. The number of concurrent instances was set to 4 for PBFT, and to 1 for BFT-Mencius and Spinning. These values led to the best results.
As we can see on Figure 2 , BFT-Mencius has slightly lower throughput and higher latency until 120 clients. This is due to the batching policy used, as the number of clients is not enough to fill the batch. We set the batch size to 1350B so that the size of messages used to transmit batches matches the frame size of underlying Ethernet network. Servers do not wait indefinitely in order to fill batches, instead they send (partially filled) batches 3ms after the first message in the batch was delivered. The same batching policy is used with PBFT, while for Spinning we used the adaptive batching strategy used also in the original Spinning implementation [13] . 10 With BFTMencius 120 clients or less is not enough to fill the batch, i.e., the latency is dominated by the batch timeout (3ms). With more than 120 clients, BFT-Mencius is performing comparably to PBFT and Spinning.
C. Executions with performance failures by faulty servers
In order to measure performance of BFT-Mencius under performance failures, we run experiments where the faulty server delays sending of the PRE-PREPARE message in ATAB-instances it owns. Similarly, for Spinning and PBFT, the faulty server delays sending PRE-PREPARE whenever it is coordinator. Otherwise, the server normally participates in all algorithms. The number of clients for this experiment was set to 200 for all algorithms. We have chosen the number of clients based on failure-free case where performance started to level off for all algorithms. For BFT-Mencius, we set K lat (see Section VI-B) to 1. Thus we use the duration of the two last locally started ATAB instances as the suspect timeout for the blacklisting mechanism (cp. 2 · d AT AB in Section VI-C).
We have measured performance of the three protocols by varying values for the attack delay. As we can observe in Figure 3 , the performance of PBFT and Spinning, compared to the failure-free case, can be significantly degraded by a faulty replica doing a performance attack. We can also observe that always rotating the primary makes Spinning more robust to performance attacks than PBFT: its average latency is significantly better, albeit still dependent on the attack delay.
On the other hand, once the attack delay is above the suspicion timeout, the blacklisting mechanism of BFT-Mencius allows us to skip instances of blacklisted servers. Setting the suspicion timeout as explained in Section VI-B, faulty servers are blacklisted already with an attack-delay of 3ms. This allows BFT-Mencius to achieve latency always below 5ms, and throughput close to the peak throughput achieved in the failure-free case.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We have proposed a new state machine replication protocol for partially synchronous systems with Byzantine faults. The algorithm, called BFT-Mencius, is a modular, signaturefree SMR protocol that ensures bounded-delay, i.e., eventual bounded latency during periods of synchrony, even in the presence of Byzantine processes. BFT-Mencius is based on a new communication primitive, Abortable Timely Announced Broadcast (ATAB). In cluster settings, BFT-Mencius achieves bounded latency and throughput comparable to state-of-the-art algorithms such as PBFT and Spinning in fault-free configurations. In other words, contrary to these protocols, BFT-Mencius is able to maintain the same performance under performance attacks.
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